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LEGISLATIVE
CURTAILMENT OF
JURISDICTION OF
FEDERAL COURTS
ANGELO AIOSA, ESQUIRE
A spate of bills has been presented to Congress containing provisions
limiting, in one way or another, the jurisdiction of the federal courts.'
These provisions appear in bills aimed at undoing the effects of contro-
versial Supreme Court rulings in such areas as abortion, busing, and
school prayer.2 For example, H.R. 761 denies jurisdiction to all United
States courts, including the Supreme Court, "to make any decision, or
issue any order, which would have the effect of requiring any individual
to attend any particular school."'
However noble some of the ultimate goals of these bills may be, they
should be viewed with the utmost circumspection. In their fervor to offer
a "quick fix" for some of the social problems engendered by these contro-
versial decisions of the Court, they do great damage to fundamental as-
pects of our system of law which outweigh any benefit they could bestow.4
The curtailment of jurisdiction as a means of nullifying unpopular
See, e.g., S. 951, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2.5 (1982), 128 CONG. REC. S393 (daily ed. Feb. 4,
1982); S. 1741, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), 127 CONG. REC. S11,514 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1981);
H.R. 867, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), 127 CONG. REC. H116 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1981).
S. 1741, a bill introduced by Senator Helms, would, if enacted, eliminate the jurisdiction
of lower federal courts to issue any order in any case involving a state or local statute that
protects the rights of persons between conception and birth, limits or regulates abortion, or
provides funding or other assistance for abortions. See S. 1741, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981),
127 CONG. REc. S11,514 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1981). H.R. 867 would remove from the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts cases arising out of either any
" '[state statute, ordinance, rule, regulation, or any part thereof' which relates to abortion
or any 'Act interpreting, applying or enforcing' any such state act." Committee on Federal
Legislation, Jurisdiction-Stripping Proposals in Congress: The Threat to Judicial Consti-
tutional Review, 36 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 557, 558, 564 (1981).
' H.R. 761, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), 127 CONG. REC. H73 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981).
' Moynihan, Constitutional Crisis, 27 CATH. LAW. 271, 282 (1982).
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Supreme Court holdings is not a new idea.5 Although attempts have been
made before, there is little by way of case law establishing the extent to
which the judicial power granted by the Constitution is subject to control
by Congress.
The landmark case of Ex parte McCardle' presented an egregious
example of Congress' exercise of its power to restrict the appellate juris-
diction of the Supreme Court. An act passed in 1867 had given the Su-
preme Court appellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases. Previously,
the Court had jurisdiction to grant only original writs of habeas corpus,
but it had used this power, aided by its power to grant writs of certiorari,
to review a denial of habeas corpus by a lower court. Although McCardle
was not in the military service, he was held in custody by military author-
ity upon charges founded on his publication of an article alleged to be
"incendiary and libelous." 8 Upon denial of the writ by the United States
circuit court, he appealed to the Supreme Court.9 While his case was
pending before the Court, Congress, fearing that the Court would reverse
and thus invalidate much reconstruction legislation, passed a statute that
removed the Court's new appellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases,
including those that were pending.'0
The Court held that the case was fully governed by the power of
Congress under article III of the Constitution to regulate and make ex-
ceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, stating, "We
are not at liberty to inquire into motives of the Legislature. We can only
examine into its power under the Constitution; and the power to make
exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express
words."" The one encouraging aspect of the case comes at the very con-
clusion. The Court noted that the effect of the repealing act was not to
deny the whole appellate power of the Court in habeas corpus cases, but
only to deny appeals from circuit courts under the act of 1867.2 The de-
vice previously used by the Court to review denials of habeas corpus by
lower courts, namely, original writs of habeas corpus, aided by a writ of
certiorari, could continue to be used.
A number of considerations support the conclusion that the proposed
curtailments of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction would probably be
See Freund, Storm Over the American Supreme Court, 21 MOD. L. REV. 345, 345-58
(1958). For a collection of attempts to limit the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
see Elliott, Court-Curbing Proposals in Congress, 33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 597, 597-612 (1958).
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
Id. at 507.
8 Id. at 508.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 514.
Id.
12 Id. at 515.
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unconstitutional. First, it is far from clear that the result in McCardle
can be analogized to the total excision of Supreme Court jurisdiction pro-
posed by the subject bills.1 3 Persons seeking habeas corpus relief because
of deprivation of their constitutionally protected liberty could obtain re-
view of denials of such relief both before and after McCardle through the
means of an original petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme
Court aided by a writ of certiorari.1 4 In contrast, the removal of all Su-
preme Court jurisdiction attempted by the subject bills would, if effec-
tive, prevent that Court from ever reviewing cases involving the excepted
matter by any means, thereby preventing the ultimate vindication of con-
stitutional rights by the tribunal established for that purpose.
An important if not essential basis for the constitutional establish-
ment of a Supreme Court with the power of appellate review is to ensure,
in the words of Hamilton, "uniformity in the interpretation of the na-
tional laws."' 5 As Hamilton further observed, "Thirteen independent
courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same
laws, is a hydra in government, from which nothing but contradiction and
confusion can proceed."'"
Recently, the Conference of Chief Justices expressed "serious con-
cern" over the subject bills and the impact that they would have on state
courts. 17 Characterizing the legislation as "a hazardous experiment with
the vulnerable fabric of the nation's judicial system," the chief justices
observed that "[w]ithout the unifying function of United States Supreme
Court review, there inevitably will be divergence in state court decisions,
and thus the United States Constitution could mean something different
in each of the fifty states.""'
In addition to arguments based on the awesome implications of an
unbridled power in Congress to excise from the Supreme Court's appel-
late jurisdiction cases involving the vindication of fundamental constitu-
tional rights, as well as arguments for the need for uniformity, respectable
arguments have been advanced that it simply was never the purpose of
the exceptions and regulations clause to confer upon Congress the power
to curtail the Court's power to review questions of law, but rather that
the purpose was simply to give Congress the power to limit review of
,3 Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109
U. PA. L. REV. 157, 179-80 (1960).
1" Id. at 180. "The statute, however, did not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to decide
McCardle's case . . . . The legislation did no more than eliminate one procedure for Su-
preme Court review of decisions while leaving another equally efficacious one available. Id.
15 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 535 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
' Id.
17 Editorial Opinion & Comment, The Chiefs Speak, 68 A.B.A. J. 386, 386 (1982).
18 Id.
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questions of fact."9 A study of what took place at the federal convention
and ratification debates fails to disclose anything to indicate that it was
the intent of the Framers to confer so broad a power in Congress as to
enable it to curtail the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction with re-
spect to constitutional issues." Contemporaneous interpretations given to
the regulations and exceptions clause likewise support the proposition
that what the Framers contemplated was simply a power to limit the
Court's jurisdiction with respect to matters of fact. 1
Perhaps the most important argument that can be made against the
subject bills is their obvious disingenuous nature. Under the guise of
merely "regulating" the jurisdiction of the courts, they are in reality
aimed at undoing or preventing holdings of the Supreme Court. The
Framers went to great pains to include a cumbersome, and as Justice
Frankfurter called it, "leaden footed," mechanism for amending the Con-
stitution, for the very purpose of requiring that alteration be effectuated
only pursuant to the will of more than a mere majority of Congress.22
Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr. has called it a "monstrous illogic" to assume
that the power to regulate jurisdiction is actually a power to regulate
rights.23
No one familiar with the workings of the Constitution would assert
that any one constitutional provision can have the effect of negating other
provisions.2 The conclusion that commands greater respect is that, while
Congress has the power to regulate and make exceptions to federal juris-
diction, that power should be exercised in such a way as not to negate
other provisions of the Constitution. As stated by Robert Meserve on be-
half of the ABA in congressional testimony on these bills, "[o]nce we start
down this road, only an unusual sense of self-restraint may stand in the
way of a wide negation. . . of constitutional guarantees. Congress should
not go this way."25 Elimination of established constitutional rights at the
will of bare congressional majorities clearly should not be the chosen
'9 Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 MINN.
L. REV. 53, 68 (1962).
30 See Ratner, supra note 13, at 171-72.
" See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See U.S. CONST. art. V.
'3 See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS & THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 317 (1953).
24 See, e.g., Note, Removal of Supreme Court Jurisdiction: A Weapon Against Obscenity?,
1969 DUKE L.J. 291, 309-13; see also Constitutional Restraints Upon the Judiciary: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., 32, 34 (statement of Prof. Paul M. Bator, Harvard University) ("the power
of Congress to regulate jurisdiction cannot be exercised in a manner which violates some
other constitutional rule").
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 411-12
(1981) (statement of Robert Meserve).
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path. For the above reasons, these legislative proposals should be rejected
by all who are committed to the orderly and deliberate development of
our constitutional law.
